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RECENT LEGISLATION:
WHERE ARE WE GOING WITH FEDERAL HATE
CRIMES LEGISLATION?
CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1990s, the concept of hate crime burgeoned in the
American, as well as the global, imagination.1 Here in America, public
interest and engagement of the problem of hate crime reached its zenith
in the wake of the brutal and widely publicized 1998 murders of
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.2 Following the Byrd and Shepard
1. Use of the expansive term "global" is to emphasize that hate crime is not a concept
that is unique to the United States, but is a problem recognized to have an international
character. Mark S. Hamm, Conceptualizing Hate Crime in a Global Context, in HATE CRIME:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSES AND CONTROL 173, 174 (Mark S. Harem ed.,
1994).
2. See generally Richard Lacayo, The New Gay Struggle, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 32
(including several articles that discuss homosexuality, its impact on marriage, and hate crime
legislation). See generally TIME, Oct. 26, 1998. The cover of this issue captured the deer
fence on the Wyoming plains where Matthew Shepard was left for dead. Id. For many,
including the author, the cover photo was a first and enduringly haunting image that has
attached to the problem of hate violence against homosexuals in America. See Lacayo, supra,
at 32. See also Carol Marie Cropper, Black Man Fatally Dragged in a Possible Racial Killing,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A16; James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead;- 2 are
Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A9. It is of note here that the wide coverage of these
two particular crimes is viewed by some in a somewhat dubious light. John S. Baker, Jr.,
United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal "Hate Crime" Legislation, 80
B.U. L. Rev. 1191 (2000). Baker's article, as part of a symposium in the journal's winter issue,
takes up many arguments against federal hate crime legislation that are discussed later in this
Comment. One of these arguments is that sensational coverage by the media of the Byrd and
Shepard murders presents political concussions. Baker says:
In the effort to enact federal "hate crime" legislation, the drum-beat, like that for
federal gun control, has come from the march of the mass-media. The horrific
nature of certain crimes, like the murders of James Byrd, Jr., Matthew Shepard, and
the magnitude of the multiple murders at Columbine, has the power to transform a
local crime into an event of national impact, generating demands for a federal
criminal law response. Even when the state law response is adequate, the national
attention drawn by these cases typically generates a corresponding call for a national
response. As I found in testifying before the House Judiciary Committee,
proponents of a federal "hate crime" statute use the headline cases to frame the
debate as a test of opposition to or support for hate.
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murders; a cognizance of the nature and degree of hate crimes in the
United States has ballooned . Symbiotically, the problem of hate crime
has become even more entrenched in the conscience of lawmakers in
Congress, who as far back as the 1980s, have shown a commitment to
forging legislation to address this problem!
In its 106th term, the United States Congress gave significant
attention to two competing hate crime bills: The Hate Crime Prevention
Act of 1999 (HCPA), authored principally by Senator Edward Kennedy
(D-Mass.), and a subsequently authored competing bill sponsored by
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah).5 Both bills proposed extending a line of
modem federal hate crime legislation that began in 1990 when Congress
passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA).6 Indeed, scholars
Id. at 1194 (citations omitted). Cf. Rich Tafel, Hate as a Way of Winning, Log Cabin
Republicans CR OP/ED, Nov. 2, 2000, available at http://www.lcr.org/press/
20001102oped.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2001) (examining the use of hate as an election
strategy by Democrats). It is noteworthy that the article is found on the LCR-Log Cabin
Republicans-website. The Log Cabin Republicans are perhaps the most prolific and
powerful gay Republican group. The article's appearance in this forum suggests that the
rhetoric in it must be qualified as being, necessarily, partisan. Tafel says:
In the past Democrats used Medicare, social security, and AIDS to make people
think their lives would end without the Democrats, but such tactics don't work as
well anymore. Because people within the Republican Party have succeeded in
putting those issues front and center through hard work, [Democrats] have to get
"imaginative" again.
The new fear tactic is hate. And it's not just hate as manifested by the heinous
murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, which outraged everyone and drew
public condemnation from the chairmen of both the Democratic and Republican
parties. It's hate toward any gay person who doesn't want to support the
"imaginative" tactics Democrats are using in the closing days of this election.
Id. The significance of this rhetoric, though qualified as necessarily partisan, illustrates the
degree to which the political debate over hate crime is charged.
3. See generally Cropper, supra note 2; Brooke, supra note 2.
4. As early as 1988, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) is quoted on the floor of the U.S.
Congress as affirming that "there is a serious problem in America with hate crimes of all
types," and that "[lI]egislation is needed to address [this] serious problem." JAMES B. JACOBS
& KIMBERLY POTrER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY POLITICs 52
(Michael Tonry & Norvel Morris eds., 1998).
5. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter HCPA].
Authored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), the HCPA was introduced on March 16,
1999. The bill had thirty-three original co-sponsors and added ten throughout the first and
second sessions of the 106th Congress. Senator Orrin Hatch introduced an alternative to the
HCPA on July 21, 1999, late in the first session of the 106th Congress. The "Hatch" bill
differed significantly from Kennedy's HCPA and was introduced with no co-sponsors. To
Combat Hate Crimes, S. 1406, 106th Cong. (1999).
6. See Hate Crimes Statistic Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994) [hereinafter HCSA].
Signed into law by President George H. Bush, the HCSA garnered substantial bi-partisan
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and proponents of hate crime legislation have viewed the extension that
is addressed by the proposed bills as the "logical culmination" of this
line of federal hate crime legislation that had begun in 1990 with the
HCSA.' Opponents of the measures, on the other hand, have expressed
many concerns with the kind of law proposed by these measures.8
At the time lawmakers proposed the HCSA, the spearhead of what
can be termed modern federal hate crime legislation, the identified
purpose was to quantify "what was, at that point, an unquantified
problem."9 The HCSA initiated modern hate crime legislation by giving
the Department of Justice the charge of gathering and recording
statistics of bias motivated crime.' ° Having kept its charge over the past
nine years, quantification of the problem is now one commodity the
federal government has in surplus." What is to be done with this data
support, passing in the House 368-47, see 135 CONG. REC. H3238 (1989), and in the Senate
92-4, see 136 CONG. REc. S1067 (1990). However, its passage was not free from partisan
wrangling. See Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Bill Requiring Data Gathering on 'Hate Crimes,'
WASH. POST, Feb. 9,1990, at A19.
7. Murad Kalam, Recent Legislation: Hate Crime Prevention, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
593,597 (2000).
8. See generally Baker, supra note 2; JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 27-28. See also
Kalam, supra note 7, at 597 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) as saying, "[b]efore we
take the step of making every criminal offense motivated by hatred a federal offense, we
ought to equip states and localities with the resources necessary so that they can undertake
these criminal investigations and prosecutions on their own."). Many constitutional and
statutory reasons are proffered in opposition to federal hate crime legislation, including but
not limited to the idea that such legislation encroaches unconstitutionally on the states'
discretion in prosecuting criminal conduct. Id. at 597-98.
9. Kalam, supra note 7, at 596 (quoting then FBI director William Session's comments
on the passage of the act: "Until now, we have been unable to ascertain the full scope of hate
crimes in America," quoted in Jerry Seper, FBI Chief Pledges to Make Hate-Crimes Data
Priority, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at A6).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 534. The HCSA mandated that the Department of Justice gather and
record all reported incidents of bias-motivated crime for a period of five years. The Act was
buttressed by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which provided
additional funding and focus to the Department of Justice data gathering effort. See Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 [hereinafter
VCCLEA]. The Act, in addition to expanding the data gathering efforts of the HCSA, was
part of an omnibus crime bill that also required the U.S. Sentencing Commission to provide
sentencing enhancements for hate crimes. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (enhancing penalties for
hate crimes). The Act was also re-authorized for an additional five years with the passage of
the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996. See Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (1996) (codified in pertinent part as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 247
(1994 & Supp. III 1997) and 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994 & Supp. III 1997)) [hereinafter
CAPA].
11. The use of statistical data has been a principal means by which we have given shape
to this concept or problem. Likewise, statistical data has been a key component of the hate-
crime legislation that has been passed throughout the past decade at both the federal and
20011
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
and, consequently, where we are going with federal hate crime
legislation is decidedly less settled.
Both of the competing hate crime measures introduced in the 106th
state level in the United States. This is because we, in America, measure or quantify
problems relating to the criminal law through the use of statistics. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, DATA
COLLECTION GUIDELINES (1999), available at http://www.fbi.govlucrlhatecrime.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2001) (explaining that hate crime statistics are available as part of a
comprehensive system of federal criminal statistic collection known as the Uniform Crime
Reports) [hereinafter FBI HATE CRIME STATISTICS]; see also STATE OF WISCONSIN OFFICE
OF JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTER, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,
1998 CRIMES AND ARRESTS, APP. III-HAT CRIMES (1998), available at
http://oja.state.wi.us/static/crimel998.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2001) [hereinafter WIS. CRIME
REPORTS]. The Office of Justice Assistance is in charge of collecting statistics on hate crime
occurring within the state of Wisconsin. Thus, law enforcement at both the state and federal
levels is informed, albeit in a reactionary sense, to this data. The one certain thing that can be
said about this practice of criminal statistic keeping is that these statistics are, necessarily,
backward looking. See, e.g., FBI HATE CRIME STATISTICS, supra (reporting statistics only
through 1999); WI CRIME REPORTS, supra (reporting statistics only through 1999). In many
ways, efforts to address the problem of hate crime in the United States, and in particular the
practice of compiling statistics as an initial step, was derived from private advocacy groups.
For example, the Southern Poverty Law Center, an organization that since its inception in
1971 has been focused on combating hate crime, buttressed its efforts by the production and
circulation of a newsletter entitled Klanwatch that sought to document all instances of bias-
motivated violence. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, available at http://www.splcenter.
org/intelligenceproject/ip-index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2001). Together with a
subsequently created newsletter, the Militia Task Force, the two form the comprehensive
Intelligence Report, which operates as one of the organization's principle weapons in their
fight against hate activity. Id. The organization's founder, Morris Dees, created the
newsletter (collectively the Intelligence Report), thinking that a problem cannot be addressed
sufficiently until it is sufficiently quantified, or assessed. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
CENTER, available at http:llwww.splcenter.orglcenterinfo/ci-index.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2001). However, much of the vast scholarship examining hate crime admonishes that such
statistical data be carefully scrutinized. JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 55-59 (urging
that the data regarding hate crime, whether from public or private sources should be carefully
"construct[ed]"). This admonition is intuitive because the calculus of interpreting, or as
Jacobs & Potter suggest-constructing, the statistical data on hate crimes involves many
variables. Id. at 59. For instance, what exactly, for reporting purposes, is a hate crime? Who
is compiling the data? How exactly do the numbers crunch? How many and what kind of
reporting agencies are being polled and over what span of time? See generally id. at 55-59.
The federalization of statistical compilation worked only marginally to normalize data
collection focused on hate crime because this data is also susceptible of being misleading. See
generally id. For instance, a steady increase in state and local participation in the process of
collecting hate crime data has resulted in an increase in the number of hate crimes that are
reported. Id. See also FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS,
DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES (1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2001) (seeking to specify all the above mentioned "variables" in an effort to offer
clarity in their Uniform Crime Reports). For the many reasons listed in this footnote, this
Comment will not address a performance of any variation of the statistical calculus described
above. Rather, this piece will address the theoretical, moral, and ideological hurdles
implicated by federal hate crime legislation.
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Congress were tabled,2 and notwithstanding the serious attention given
each, neither bill reached a final vote by the joint membership of the
106th Congress." To be sure, the bare fact that these two measures died
in Senate committee is not, on its own, extraordinary. Indeed, hundreds
of proposed bills met a similar fate in the 106th Congress. What is
extraordinary is the way the debate, and ultimate failure, of these
measures aptly informs the principal inquiry at hand: where are we
going with federal hate crime legislation?
The fact that two hate crime measures were brought before both the
House and the Senate in the 106th Congress is significant for two
reasons. First, it shows that the passage of an additional federal hate
crime law was a priority of most of the members of the 106th Congress.
Second, the existence of a competing bill connotes not only a
controversy as to how to effectuate this seemingly bi-partisan legislative
priority, but also an attempt at compromise. The fact that both bills
were tabled is also significant because it shows that the 106th Congress
remained embroiled over a resolution to the issue at the end of its
term,14 resolving only that this battle should be left to fight another day.
The differences in the two hate crime measures brought before the
106th Congress frame the principal controversy over where the federal
government will go next with legislation preventing hate activity. These
differences are subtle, and perhaps at first blush, even negligible. Yet,
as it is often said-the devil is in the details. But what do the details
show us here? Upon close examination of these two competing
measures, the problematic distinction centers on the question of
whether persons victimized because of their sexual orientation should
be among those protected under a substantive federal hate crime law. 5
12. See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, How CONGRESS WORKS, 102-13 (3d
ed. 1998) (discussing the various fates that befall congressional bills when differences are not,
as the subsection suggests, resolved) [hereinafter How CONGRESS WORKS].
13. Richard Simon, Expanded Hate Crime Measure Dropped, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000,
at A17 (discussing the circumstances, addressed later in this Comment, surrounding the
tabling of the HCPA).
14. See id.
15. Both the HCSA and the VCCLEA include in their provisions a category for sexual
orientation. In the former, statistics relating to violence against persons because of their real
or perceived sexual orientation are gathered; and in the latter, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission is authorized to provide sentence enhancements for these acts of violence. 28
U.S.C. § 534 note; 28 U.S.C. § 994 note. While this fact shows that Congress has considered
the category of sexual orientation in its hate crime laws, both the HCSA and the VCCLEA
do not provide the substantive protections for this category. The HCPA proposes to provide
substantive protection to persons victimized because of their sexual orientation. This
protection is absent from existing federal hate crime law. See HCPA, S. 622 § 4 (1999)
2001]
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The HCPA unequivocally says that gay, lesbian, and bisexual men and
women should be afforded such protection, and purports to amend the
United States Code to include language clearly expressing such.16 The
competing bill does not, but in terms that are decidedly less clear.17 The
debate over hate crimes in the 106th Congress unquestionably shows
that sexual orientation is the legislative quandary that has vexed
Congress with respect to this area of law 1-- an area of law that until now
has had significant legislative momentum.
This Comment examines both the HCPA of 1999 and the "Hatch"
bill, focusing primarily on the debate raging over the inclusion of sexual
orientation as a category protected by this kind of legislation. Part II of
this Comment offers a brief background of hate crime legislation and
pays attention to the operation of these types of laws at both the state
and federal levels. Part III examines where we have come with a stream
of modem federal hate crime legislation, culminating with the two
competing hate crime bills that were introduced in the 106th Congress.
Finally, Part IV considers some of the immediate and future hurdles
faced by proponents of hate crime legislation at the federal level and
focuses on Congress's debate over sexual orientation. In sum, this
Comment purports to answer the question: where are we going with
federal hate crime legislation?
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hate Crimes, Generally
It is germane to a discussion of where we are going with federal hate
crime legislation to discuss where we are with respect to this kind of
legislation and what steps the federal government has taken to bring us
to where we are. In order to answer to these questions, we must know
exactly what it is we are talking about. Indeed, as James Jacobs and
(proposing to amend title 18, section 245 of the United States Code).
16. HCPA, S. 622 § 4. The bill chooses the definition of "hate crime" provided in the
VCCLEA. Under this definition, a hate crime is "a crime in which the defendant
intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property crime, the property that is the object
of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person." 28 U.S.C. § 994 note. Enactment of
the bill would have effectively created new categories of persons who would be extended
substantive hate crime protection under federal law. HCPA, S. 622 § 4. Currently,
substantive hate crime protections under federal law only extend to persons victimized
because of their race, color, religion, or national origin. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994).
17. See To Combat Hate Crimes, S. 1406, 106th Cong. (1999).
18. See discussion supra note 13.
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Kimberly Potter rightly assert in their 1998 treatise on hate crime, "We
cannot talk about how much hate crime exists in the United States or
what to do about it until we are clear about what a hate crime is. "'9
Definition, then, is central to any discussion of hate crime legislation.
20
This, to be sure, is the case with all legislation; however, in the context
of federal hate crime legislation, defining precisely what kind of conduct
and mental state a particular law will proscribe and against what kind of
victim the law will apply has been both salt and fire to the bitter,
ongoing debate over hate crimes.2 The argument always comes down to
definition because it is through definition that these two core legislative
questions are resolved.
It is best to begin by looking at hate crime in the way that scholars,
legislators, and law enforcement officials have come to view the
problem. Most of these groups have begun to discuss hate crime,
generically, under the broad mantle of "bias-motivated crime."'  This
concept, verily distilled, suggests that a hate crime is an act of
prejudice.?' We can give this a little more shape, though, by adducing
that hate crimes are committed against persons who are victimized
19. JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 11.
[T]he concept of hate crime is loaded with ambiguity because of the difficulty in
determining (1) what is meant by prejudice; (2) which prejudices qualify for
inclusion under the hate crime umbrella; (3) which crimes, when attributable to
prejudice, become hate crimes; and (4) how strong the causal link must be between
the perpetrator's prejudice and the perpetrator's criminal conduct.
Id.
20. Id.
21. Kalam, supra note 7, at n.39 ("The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, like the
HCPA, confronted significant conservative resistance at its inception, in part because it
included 'sexual orientation' as a class of hate crime victims. Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
called the bill the 'flagship of the militant homosexual legislative agenda."') (citation
omitted).
22. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN
LAW 9 (1999). Lawrence posits that bias crime is an act of prejudice, and thus different from
the two broad categories that compose the "universe" of violent crimes. The first being
"crimes committed without regard to any personal characteristics of the victim" like muggings
and robberies where the victim is chosen by "the requirements of the crime," as in the case of
a bank teller. Id. The second group contains all crimes committed against the victim because
of who they are. These include crimes of passion, revenge crimes, or any cases where the
victim could not be "interchanged with someone else." Id. Thus, Lawrence asserts that bias
crimes are unlike the first category because "distinct identifying characteristics of the victim
are critical to the perpetrator's choice of victim." Id. They are also unlike the second




because of their identification with a certain group or class. 4 It is easy
to see the numerous legislative concerns posed by laws of this sort,
especially when considering these kinds of crimes in the federal forum.
Not the least significant among these concerns is that we are talking
about criminal law, which is an area of law that is traditionally within the
purview of the several states.' An equally significant concern is the
problem of legislative classification-a concern that has been perhaps
best described as a "perennial" one.26
24. FBI, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, supra note 11. In keeping with the modem trend of
federal hate crime legislation, the FBI, under the authority given to it by the Hate Crime
Statistics Act of 1990, began their data gathering effort defining a hate crime as a "criminal
offense committed against a person or property, which is motivated, in whole or part, by the
offender's bias against a race, religion, ethnic/national origin group, or sexual orientation
group." Id. (emphasis added). Cf VCCLEA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994) and discussion,
supra note 10 (specifying that "'hate crime' means a crime in which the defendant
intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property crime, the property that is the object
of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person").
25. See Baker, supra note 2, at 1192:
Short of violating the First Amendment and other restraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment, state legislatures are free to legislate broadly in this area if they so
decide. Not satisfied with the response at the state level, some lobbyists want a
federal "hate crime" statute. The Congress, however, must identify some particular
constitutional power in order to enact any piece of criminal legislation. Although
the states enjoy general police powers; the federal government does not.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Larry Wheeler, Rep. Deal Says Hate Crime Amendment
Oversteps Bounds, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, June 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4401505.
This explains Representative Deal's (R-Gainsville, FL) disagreement with a federal hate
crimes amendment that the Senate attached to a defense authorization bill. The article states
his belief that "expanding the hate crimes categories [as per the HCPA] is a further erosion of
the U.S. Constitution that envisioned a federal government of limited powers." Deal is also
quoted in the article as saying "[w]e don't need to go sticking our nose into things that are the
jurisdiction of the states." Id.
26. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Justice Douglas, speaking for a
unanimous court, stated:
[t]he problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no
doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies... [o]r the reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind.
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B. Hate Crime Laws Among the Several States
1. Generally
Anthony S. Winer posits that "[s]tate laws designed to address the
hate crime phenomenon fall broadly into two categories: hate speech
statutes and hate crime statutes." 27 For many reasons, states have, by
and large, focused their efforts on passing hate crime statutes.' Since
the passage of the HCSA, states have taken the initiative in passing their
own hate crime statutes.29 Indeed, as of 1999, all fifty states had one or
more of what may be fairly called hate crime statutes on the books.
Yet, these statutes vary a great deal in terms of the kind of conduct they
proscribe, as well as the class of persons they are designed to protect.31
Thus, all hate crimes statutes are not created equal, and close
examination of the differences between the hate crime statutes enacted
by the several states shows that such statutes are indeed cast in many
forms.'
27. Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 387,419.
Hate crime statutes, unlike hate speech statutes, are not by their terms directed at
expressive statements. Instead, they increase the penalties applicable to those
convicted of violent crimes... Hate speech statutes are designed to redress harm
inflicted when a person makes a statement or engages in expressive conduct that
derides or devalues the hearer because of the hearer's race, color, religion, sexual
orientation, or other analogous characteristic.
Id. at 419-21.
28. Id. at 422 ("Hate crime statutes in most cases stand on firmer constitutional footing
than hate speech statutes, but hate crime statutes are not completely exempt from
constitutional challenge."); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding
that laws intending to proscribe even "unprotected" speech must be content-neutral in order
to eschew a presumption of invalidity under the First Amendment). Winer goes on to say
that most of these hate crime statutes fall within three broad categories: 1) penalty
enhancement statutes, which are to act as supplements or provide sentencing enhancements
to already enacted sections of the state criminal code; 2) substantive or new crime statutes,
which are themselves free-standing crimes that are described in their own terms and with
their own elements; and 3) model civil rights statutes, which generically proscribe
abridgement of a victim's civil rights, which are generally characterized as those rights
guaranteed by federal and state constitutions and/or laws. See Winer, supra note 27, at 422-
24.
29. See LAWRENCE, supra note 22, app. A.
30. Id.
31. Winer, supra note 27, at 422 (stating that "the various state hate crime statutes are
drafted in distinct ways").
32. See LAWRENCE, supra note 22, app. A. Lawrence's appendix shows that the hate
crime or bias crime statutes enacted by the several states vary in significant ways. These
2001]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
It is essential to a discussion of federal hate crime legislation to
undertake an inquiry into the way the several states have handled this
legislative challenge. This is because the sufficiency of the several
states' involvement in addressing this kind of crime is a disputed issue in
the debate over the necessity of a federal hate crime statute.-
Moreover, an understanding of the way the several states have handled
this kind of legislation is essential because state statutes have been
reviewed by the courts.' In reviewing states' hate crime statutes, courts
have had the opportunity to articulate why such statutes, in their various
forms, do or do not pass constitutional muster. 5
2. Wisconsin v. Mitchell36 and State Hate Crime Statutes
The saga that resulted in the United States Supreme Court's 1993
statutes range in form from penalty enhancement to pure bias crime statutes. The statutes
also differ with respect to the requisite state of mind or mens rea. These differences range
from racial animus to discriminatory selection of victim and "because of" scienters.
Moreover, the statutes vary a great deal in terms of what categories of victims they protect.
Among the categories protected by various state statutes are: race, color, ethnicity, national
origin, religion, creed, ancestry, sexual orientation, sex/gender, age, disability, and political
affiliation. Also fitting underneath the umbrella of state hate crime statutes are crimes that
include institutional vandalism (including desecration of religious institutions),
disturbing/obstructing religious worship, cross burning, and mask wearing. Id.
33. Id. at 155. Lawrence outlines that there are two sources of strong federal interest
that warrant federal bias crime legislation. He explains:
The first arises out of the problem of state default in bias crime prosecution, the
prime justification for the original creation of federal criminal civil rights legislation.
During the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, state governments,
particularly in the South, could not be relied upon to investigate and prosecute bias
crimes within their jurisdiction. Even through the middle part of this century, state
default has remained a critical factor warranting a federal role in bias crimes....
[The] crudest form of state default, present for a full century after the Civil War, is
far less common today. Still, a less pernicious form of state default continues to exist
is [sic] some circumstances, and calls for a federal role in these crimes.
Id. According to Lawrence, the second source of federal interest warranting federal bias
crime legislation applies even in the absence of state default, and involves the concept of dual
prosecutions covered by a theory called the "Petite Policy," an internal policy of the U.S.
Department of Justice that "restricts federal prosecution following a state trial to instances
[where significant] reasons exist to prosecute." Id. at 159. Among such instances, Lawrence
singles out the Rodney King case, "where such compelling reasons were deemed to exist." Id.
34. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476 (1993).
35. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 30-34 (discussing the constitutional holdings of the
U.S. Supreme Court in R.A.V. and Mitchell). Lawrence explains that while the Court did not
view the type of law enacted in R.A.V. favorably, Mitchell represents "the first case in which
the Supreme Court expressly sustained a modern bias crime law." Id. at 30.
36. 508 U.S. 476.
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decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell37 is among the most prominent
instances where the Court has interpreted a state hate crime statute!'
At issue in this case was the constitutionality of the statute.39  The
Mitchell case was the first case to test Wisconsin's newly enacted bias-
crime penalty enhancement statute.40
The defendant in the case, Todd Mitchell, was an African-American
male who was convicted in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County of
aggravated battery for his part in the severe beating of Gregory Riddick,
37. Id.
38. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377.
39. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 2000). This statute exists today as it did when it
underwent review by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. WIS. STAT. ANN. §
939.645 provides:
Penalty; crimes committed against certain people or property. (1) If a person does
all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are increased as provided
in sub. (2): (a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is
committed or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime under par. (a) in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception
regarding the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property, whether or not
the actor's belief or perception was correct.
(2)(a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor other than
a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised
maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county jail.
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the
penalty increase under this section changes the status of the crime to a felony and
the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of
imprisonment is 2 years.
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum fine prescribed
by law for the crime may be increased by not more than $5,000 and the maximum
period of imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not
more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable for the
underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as
to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry or proof of any person's
perception or belief regarding another's race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that crime.
Id.
40. It is of note that while it is the general understanding that hate crime laws are passed
to protect routinely victimized groups, the facts of Wisconsin v. Mitchell show that the law
functions to punish bias-crime and that where legislators may have conceived of a law
considering a white defendant and a black complainant, the equal hand of the Wisconsin
statute applies to all crimes committed out of bias. Thus, the first test of the Wisconsin law
involved a black defendant and a white complainant. See generally Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476.
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a 14 year-old white male.4 ' The trial judge found that Mitchell had acted
out of racial bias in the selection of the victim, which implicated the
Wisconsin bias crime statute. In accordance with this statute, the
potential sentence for a crime such as the aggravated battery for which
Mitchell had been convicted is increased by five years if the actor
chooses his victim "because of the [victim's] race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry. 4 3 Ultimately,
Mitchell was sentenced to four years of a maximum seven-year prison
sentence.44
Mitchell was unsuccessful in his appeal to the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals, who affirmed the trial court's ruling. Subsequently, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review of the case.46 Upon its review,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the bias crime penalty
enhancement statute unconstitutional and consequently reversed that
portion of Mitchell's sentence.47 Specifically, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court found that the statute "violates the First Amendment directly by
punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought.",43
The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied principally on support from the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision a year earlier in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
in making its constitutional determination. 4' From this ruling, Wisconsin
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, who granted certiorari to
the case just six months after the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed
down its decision.5
From the outset, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated its objective in
hearing the case." In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
made it clear that "[t]he question presented in this case is whether this
41. Id. at 479-80.
42. Id. at 480.
43. Id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645.
44. 508 U.S. at 481; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 31.
45. 508 U.S. at 481. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Mitchell's argument,
which challenged the constitutionality of the penalty enhancement provision on First
Amendment grounds. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
46. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 475 N.W.2d 164 (Wis. 1991).
47. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. 1992) ("We granted Mitchell's
petition for review on the issue of the constitutionality of the hate crimes statute, and now
reverse.").
48. 508 U.S. at 482 (citing Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 811).
49. Id. (citing Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 815) ("[U]nder [R.A.V. v. City of St. PaulJ, 'the
Wisconsin legislature cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees.'").
50. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), cert granted, 506 U.S. 1033
(1992).
51. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 476, 482-83.
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penalty enhancement is prohibited by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.,12 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion elaborated further,
citing the importance of the specific objective of the Court in hearing
the case: "We granted certiorari because of the importance of the
question presented and the existence of a conflict of authority among
state high courts on the constitutionality of statutes similar to
Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement provision. " 53
Without dissent, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court." In so doing, it rejected Mitchell's
argument that "the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute is invalid
because it punishes the defendant's discriminatory motive, or reason, for
acting."55 The Court made it clear that "motive plays the same role
under the Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state
antidiscrimination laws, which we have previously upheld against
constitutional challenge. 5 6 The Court's decision also reconciled with its
previous holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, saying "the ordinance
struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at expression (i.e., 'speech'
or 'messages'), [whereas] the statute in this case is aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment."57 The Court continued, saying,
"the Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired
conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and
societal harm." -
So it is, then, that the decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell stands as the
last word given by the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 483.
55. Id. at 487.
56. Id.
57. Id. ("Nothing in our decision last Term in R.A.V. compels a different result here.")
(citation omitted).
58. Id. at 487-88. The Court explained that:
[A]ccording to the State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more likely to
provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and
incite community unrest .... The State's desire to redress these perceived harms
provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over and
above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases. As Blackstone said long
ago, "it is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should be
most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public safety and
happiness."
Id. at 488 (citation omitted).
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constitutionality of hate crime laws.59 Many proponents of hate crime
legislation have viewed Mitchell as a victory in the modem crusade to
enact these kinds of laws.' First and foremost, the decision is rightly
viewed as the first instance where the "modern court" expressly upheld
the constitutionality of a bias crime statute against First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges. 1 Furthermore, supporters of the decision claim
that "Mitchell represents the constitutional authority for the enactment
of bias crime laws. "62
Academic opponents of further hate crime legislation, particularly in
the federal forum, naturally opt for a narrower reading of the Court's
opinion in Mitchell.63 Such critics view the decision as, at best, a decision
on what states may do in the purview of their own police powers, and, at
worst, see the decision as "not persuasive" because "what is
constitutionally impermissible under R.A.V. and what is constitutionally
permissible under Mitchell is a distinction without a difference."64 These
critics acknowledge that "[a]ccording to the Court, the legislature may
properly single out ... criminal conduct for increased punishment based
on the judgment that such conduct causes greater harm to victims, third
parties, and society generally," ' but are put off because they believe the
holding in Mitchell makes it clear that "the sentence enhancement is
triggered by some prejudices and not others." Nevertheless, even these
59. See generally LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 30-34.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 213 n.2 (discussing the decision in Mitchell along with the Court's decisions in
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (finding that interpersonal libel fell outside the
purview of the First Amendment) and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (articulating
the First Amendment free speech standard of "incitement of 'imminent lawless action"')).
62. Id. at 30. Indeed, the Court articulates an interest that states must punish this type of
conduct. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488 (noting that "[t]he State's desire to redress these perceived
harms provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision").
63. See JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 127.
64. Id. at 129. Jacobs and Potter preface their assertion by saying "[w]e do not find the
Supreme Court decision [in Mitchell] convincing. The Court does not explain the distinction
between speech and conduct." Id. at 126. See also Baker, supra note 2, at 1192 ("Although
the states enjoy general police powers; the federal government does not.").
65. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 126.
66. Id. Perhaps it is that the arguments that come from the opponents of hate crime laws
most aptly frame the arguments made by the proponents of such laws. For example, Jacobs
and Potter assert that "[a] similarly situated offender, who engaged in the same conduct, but
for reasons of personal jealousy or spite, would have received one-third the sentence that
Mitchell received." Id. This interjects into our conversation the mantra of many opponents
to modern hate crime legislation, which is that "all crime is hate crime." Sonya Ross, Hate-
Crimes Vote Urged Clinton Wants Action by Congress Before November Elections,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 26, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3475692 (quoting then presidential
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critics of the Mitchell decision are keenly aware that "Mitchell has
declared.., hate crime laws constitutional for purposes of the federal
constitution. "6
It is clear that the concussions of the Court's decision in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell were felt by more than just the legislatures of the several states.
The year after the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell, the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA) was
signed into law."s The VCCLEA is an omnibus federal crime bill
containing many provisions relating to hate crime. The Act showed a
federal cognizance of the Mitchell decision, in that among its many
provisions was a section separately titled: The Direction to United States
Sentencing Commission Regarding Sentencing Enhancements for Hate
Crimes.69 This portion of the law requires that the United States
Sentencing Commission provide sentence enhancements for hate
crimes. It is hardly questionable that the sentence-enhancing portion of
the Act shows alertness on the part of the 103rd Congress to the
Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell.
Further evidence of Congress's awareness of Mitchell can be
garnered from the Act itself. Congress chose to recast the definition of
hate crime for the purpose of the directive to the United States
Sentencing Commission so as to comport with the statutory language
that was upheld by the Supreme Court in Mitchell, just one year earlier.70
candidate, now President George W. Bush). Proponents of hate crime legislation claim this is
precisely the point, and that critics like Jacobs and Potter have missed it. Many of these
proponents look to Mitchell as an affirmation that hate crimes, acts based on prejudice,
represent conduct that is more culpable than "spite" or "jealousy." See JACOBS & POTTER,
supra note 4, at 126.
67. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 129 (accepting this proposition resignedly).
68. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-996 (1994); see also discussion supra note 10.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 994 note. The Direction to United States Sentencing Commission
Regarding Sentencing Enhancements for Hate Crimes constitutes section 280003 of the
VCCLEA. The directive to the Commission is as follows:
Pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code, the United States Sentencing
Commission shall promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide
sentencing enhancements of not less than 3 offense levels for offenses that the finder
of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt are hate crimes. In carrying
out this section, the United States Sentencing Commission shall ensure that there is
reasonable consistency with other guidelines, avoid duplicative punishments for
substantially the same offense, and take into account any mitigating circumstances
that might justify exceptions.
Id.
70. Id. Accord WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645(1)(b) (West 2000). This statute states:
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The Act defines the term hate crime as "a crime in which the defendant
intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property crime, the
property that is the object of the crime, because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender,
disability, or sexual orientation of any person. "71 The passage of the
VCCLEA is evidence that a majority in the 103rd Congress believed
that the core constitutional questions regarding the validity of hate
crime legislation, to that point, had been answered by Mitchell.'
It is imperative as we part from our discussion on hate crime laws
among the several states that the following comparative note is made.
The Wisconsin statute that was at issue in Mitchell contains a broad
classification of hate crime victims." Wisconsin's law, as well as the
VCCLEA's directive to the United States Sentencing Commission,
targets crimes where the defendant intentionally selects a victim because
of his real or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation. 74 However, as was mentioned at
the outset of this section, all states' hate crime statutes are not equal.
Close examination of the hate crime statutes of the several states shows
that only twenty-one have language relating to bias against persons
because of their real or perceived sexual orientation, only twenty-one
states have language in their statutes relating to gender, and only
nineteen include language protecting people because of disability.75 This
latter note is germane to a discussion of federal hate crime legislation
because these figures are viewed by some as an insufficient state
response to hate crime that warrants further federal action in this area.76
Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed
or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under par.
(a) in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person
or the owner or occupant of that property, whether or not the actor's belief or
perception was correct.
Id. (emphasis added).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 994 note.
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998; see also supra note 16.
73. See WIS. STAT. ANN § 939.645.
74. WIs. STAT. ANN § 939.645(1)(b); 28 U.S.C. § 994 note; see also supra note 16.
75. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at app. A. Lawrence's appendix also includes data on
other classifications as well. For example, the table also tracks state statutes that regard
ancestry, creed, age, and political affiliation, in addition to the most common classifications of
race, religion, national origin, and ethnicity. See id.
76. Id. at 155; see also supra note 32.
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C. The Federal Government and Hate Crimes
1. Generally
Throughout the history of the United States, persons seeking
protection of their civil rights have turned to the federal government for
aid.' Indeed, many cite as the earliest enactment of federal civil rights
legislation those laws passed under Congress's authority to enforce the
post-Civil War Amendments to the Constitution." The utility of this
legacy to supporters of federal hate crime legislation is that it lends
historical credence to the theory that the federal government must act as
a fail-safe with respect to hate crimes when states demonstrate an
insufficient response.7
To be sure, President John F. Kennedy was aware of this legacy
when he addressed the nation on June 11, 1963 to rally public support
for an expansive civil rights bill." The address had come in the wake of
the widely publicized police beatings in the streets of Birmingham,
Alabama earlier that spring.81  In the address, the President solemnly
asserted that "[w]e face.., a moral crisis as a country and as a people.
It cannot be met by repressive police action. It cannot be left to
77. Kalam, supra note 7, at 594.
78. JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 36-37. The authors elaborate by saying, "After
the Civil War, in many places within the former Confederacy, local law enforcement agencies
would not prosecute crimes committed by whites against blacks, nor would local governments
permit blacks to exercise rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 36. The
authors make the further point that "[t]he federal statutes did not aim to enhance punishment
or to recriminalize conduct already covered by criminal law." Id. The authors contend,
rather, that the statutes only provided a "de facto law enforcement action." Id. Thus, if the
local authorities faithfully investigated and prosecuted those who "victimized the former
slaves," there would be virtually no need for the federal laws. Id. See also LAWRENCE, supra
note 22, at 112 ("The general intent behind the criminal civil rights laws called for vigorous
enforcement to address a compelling social ill.").
79. Kalam, supra note 7, at 595 ("The legacy of such federal protection suggests that
legislation like the [Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999] could act as an umbrella, protecting
minorities in states hesitant to punish hate crimes and remaining unused in others.").
80. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, Introduction to THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIvIL RIGHTS Acr, at xix-xx (1985).
Indeed, John F. Kennedy's political instincts told him such a bill had little chance of passing.
Id. Beyond the probability of the bill's failure, Kennedy was certain that introducing the bill
would ruin his chances for re-election. Id. Fatefully, the rest is a well known story. The bill
was submitted to Congress eight days after the television address on June 11, 1963. See id. In
November of that year, Kennedy was shot in Dallas, Texas. President Johnson signed into
law the Civil Rights Act of 1964-the law that was the subject of the address-the very next
year. See generally id.
81. Id. at xviii-xx.
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increased demonstrations in the streets. It cannot be quieted by token
moves or talk. It is a time to act in Congress ... . "8 For Kennedy, the
core of the debate over federal civil rights legislation was clear. "The
heart of the question," he asserted steadily, "is whether all Americans
are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities .... "
It perhaps goes without saying that the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which Kennedy submitted to Congress just eight days after his
beseeching address, has significantly shaped the role of the federal
government in the investigation and prosecution of civil rights
violations. This is true both generally, and with respect to hate crime in
particular.M Indeed, many of the laws that are viewed as part of the
stream of modem federal hate crime legislation have amended or
propose to amend the very same sections of the United States Code that
were created by the 1964 Act."' However, it can be said without
exaggeration that then, as now, congressional debate over the proper
role of the federal government in the enforcement of the civil rights of
its citizens has been more contentious and virulent than on most other
questions.6
2. Federalism
One reason the question of federal involvement with civil rights laws
is so hotly disputed is because this question uniquely implicates the
delicate balance of authority between the states and the federal
government under the United States Constitution that is known as
federalism." Perhaps no principle of our American government has
been more controversial. One modem text, warning that this truth
should not be doubted, reminds us that "more than 500,000 people died
during the Civil War settling problems of federalism. "" The debate over
82. Id. Kennedy explained in his address that the moral dilemma he referred to "is as
old as the Scriptures and ... as clear as the American Constitution." Id.
83. Id.
84. Kalam, supra note 7, at 598 (stating that "there do exist obvious precedents for
federally expansive legislation like the [Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999], namely the Civil
Rights Act of 1964").
85. See, e.g., CAPA, 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). This Act, added to title 18,
included prohibitions against damaging religious property that affected interstate commerce
and HCPA, S. 622 at section 4 also proposed to amend the same section identified above.
86. See generally WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 80.
87. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 110 ("Bias crimes... occur at the intersection of three
fundamental values of the American polity: equality, free expression, and federalism.").
88. MILTON C. CUMMINGS & DAVID WISE, DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 68 (8th ed. 1997).
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federalism has raged on since. As support for this theory, some point to
President Eisenhower sending federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas
to assist the court ordered integration of Central High School, or to
President Kennedy's requisitioning of the Mississippi National Guard to
aid James Meredith's enrollment in the University of Mississippi.8
In recent years, there have also been examples of the unique
relationship between the states and the federal government regarding
law enforcement. In 1992, massive rioting erupted in the Los Angeles
streets following the acquittal of four police officers charged with the
videotaped beating of Rodney King.' Three days into the melee,
President George Bush sent 1000 federal lav enforcement officers and
ordered 4500 federal troops to stand by in an attempt to "restore law
and order."'"
Many students of the federal system have noted that "the American
federal system has always been characterized by such shared functions
at the federal, state, and local levels. '"" Still, the fact remains that the
United States Constitution imbued the federal government with little
power to regulate criminal activity.'
While it can be said that the modem concept of federalism has
evolved from the notion of the federal system shared by the framers of
our Constitution, the question as to the proper balance of authority
between the states and federal government remains, too, a perennial
one. This has been especially true with regard to criminal law.94 It is
89. Id. at 73 ("There have been other dramatic examples of tension within the federal
system. Several times in recent decades the president of the United States has deployed
armed federal troops in states experiencing civil disorders."). The tension between states and
the federal government is perhaps best illustrated by an instance in June of 1963 when
Alabama governor George Wallace, who would less than five years later make a losing bid
for the presidency, carried out a pledge that he had made while running for governor to
"'stand in the schoolhouse door"' to prevent integration of the University of Alabama. Id.
Wallace, however, retreated after President Kennedy "federalized" the Alabama National
Guard to enforce the federal court integration order. Id. at 73-74.
90. Id. at 175.
91. Id. at 176. In addition, then-President Bush addressed the nation on television to
plead for racial harmony and a restoration of order. President Bush also made predictions
that the Department of Justice "might prosecute the police officers under federal civil rights
laws." Id.
92. Id. at 74. One of these scholars in particular, Michael D. Reagan, suggests that it is
not accurate any longer to think of our federal system as erecting "'a wall separating the
national and state levels of government.'' Id. Instead, Reagan says extensive federal
financial aid to the states has given us "'a nationally dominated system of shared power and
shared functions.'" Id.
93. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 114.
94. Id. at 113. Lawrence, to highlight this idea, shows a dichotomy. He first cites Chief
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worth the statistical note that, while it is indeed true that the federal
government possesses no general police powers, Congress has enacted
over three-thousand federal offenses since the time of Reconstruction,
and they have done so with the ratification of the United States
Supreme Court.95 Moreover, many of these federal laws were enacted to
address crimes that were traditionally seen as "state crimes. ",' Still, the
problem of federalism remains firmly rooted in the conscience of both
lawmakers who support and those who oppose federal laws that involve
the investigation and prosecution of civil rights in general, and hate
crimes in particular.
3. The Commerce Power
The unwavering constant that exists now, as it did during the
legislative and judicial battles fought over enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, is that "Congress ... must identify some particular
constitutional power [when it] enact[s] any piece of criminal
legislation. "'
Over the past century, we as a country have become, as one scholar
has termed it, a "culture of mobility."98 This reality led to Congress's
expansive use of the commerce power guaranteed to it under the
Constitution.' Much ink has been spilled over the evolution of this
nebulous Congressional power; however, it remains the principle
authority relied upon by Congress in their efforts to enforce civil rights
in the modern era. One prominent example of Congress's use of the
Justice Earl Warren's comments on the subject which are as follows: "It is essential that we
achieve a proper jurisdictional balance between the federal and state Court systems, assigning
to each system those cases most appropriate in the light of the basic principles of federalism."
Id. Lawrence contrasts Warren's view, which he characterizes as decidedly "optimistic" with
Frederick Douglas's view of federalism expressed nearly a century before:
While there remains such an idea as the right of each State to control its own local
affairs-an idea, by the way more deeply rooted in the minds of men of all sections
of the country than perhaps any other political idea-no general assertion of human
rights can be of any practical value.
Id. at 113-14.
95. Id. at 114-15.
96. Id. at 115. See also Kalam, supra note 7, at 598 ("Since the Civil War, Congress has
created over 3,000 federal criminal offenses, offenses that conventionally were prosecuted by
the states."); LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 115.
97. Baker, supra note 2, at 1192.
98. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 115
(1994).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce power in enforcing federal civil rights laws is illustrated by
the companion civil rights cases of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
StatesO' and Katzenbach v. McClung,1 ' which were decided during the
Supreme Court's 1964 Term. The Court's decisions in these cases
upheld, as a valid exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce,
the public accommodation provisions contained in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, notwithstanding the fact that the obstruction to commerce at
issue was caused by what had been deemed a "social or moral wrong."'
Since 1964, the extent of Congress's power to regulate civil rights via
the commerce power has undergone significant change. Indeed, it was
early in our country's existence that John Marshall declared in
McCulloch v. Maryland.. that the question regarding "the extent of the
powers actually granted [to Congress], is perpetually arising, and will
probably continue to arise, so long as our system shall exist.""
In United States v. Lopez,"5 the Supreme Court succeeded in
normalizing an analysis for determining the extent to which Congress
may utilize its granted power over interstate commerce.'0 6 In Lopez, the
Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power, namely the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those activities having a
"substantial relation to interstate commerce."'07
100. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
101. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
102. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 229-30 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996). The
editor describes the rationale of this use of the commerce power using the Court's own words
in Heart of Atlanta Motel:
[In framing the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,]
Congress also was dealing with what it considered a moral problem. But that fact
does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial
discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden which
empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the
exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular
obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a
moral and social wrong.
Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964)).
103. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,405 (1819) ("This government is acknowledged by all, to be
one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to
it... is now universally admitted.").
104. Id.
105. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 558-59. Using these articulated criteria, the Supreme Court struck down the
Federal Gun-Free Zones Act, which was aimed at the prohibition of firearms in a place that a
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Indeed, as scholars have surmised, "[t]he reach of Lopez is not yet
clear."' The Supreme Court left hanging the fact that many of its
previous cases have given substantial deference to Congress in the
exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause and have "suggested
the possibility of additional expansion.""' Yet, the Court declined at the
time of Lopez to "proceed any further."1 0 Despite this, the Commerce
Clause continues to be used as the authority for the right of the federal
government to enforce civil rights.' This is true both generally and with
respect to hate crimes.12  However, in using the power to enact
legislation relating to hate crimes, Congress must be mindful of the
Court's narrow interpretation of the scope of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.'13
III. MODERN FEDERAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION AND THE DEBATE
OVER SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990: Setting the Stage
Congress has faced federalism issues when enacting federal
legislation aimed at the problem of hate crime; however, Congress has
confronted other problems with this type of legislation as well.
Struggles over the spearhead act of modern federal hate crime
legislation, the HCSA"' give us our best insight into the struggle we now
face, or, perhaps it is more accurate to say, still face, with hate crime
legislation. In many ways, the debate over passage of a hate crimes bill
in the 106th Congress resembles the debate in the 100th Congress over
passage of the HCSA."5 Once passed, HCSA required the Department
person has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone. The five to four opinion held that
because the Act did not, according to the outlined criteria, sufficiently regulate commercial
activity or contain any requirement that possession of the firearm be connected to interstate
commerce, Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. See id.; see also
LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 116-17.
108. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 117.
109. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
110. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
111. See HCPA, S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999); To Combat Hate Crimes, S. 1406, 106th
Cong. (1999). Both of these bills cite the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution for
authority of their respective provisions.
112. See generally HCPA, S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999); To Combat Hate Crimes, S. 1406,
106th Cong. (1999).
113. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 117.
114. HCSA, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994); see also discussion supra note 6.
115. See generally WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 80.
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of Justice to systematically collect hate crime data for a period of five
years."' As early as 1985, though, many advocacy groups lobbied
Congress for a federal hate crime recording statute."7 After many
hearings, a bill was drafted and passed by the House in 1985; however,
Congress adjourned before the bill could be put before the Senate for a
vote.'
When the HCSA was re-introduced to the 100th Congress, there was
wide support for passing such a law.19 Many advocacy groups, as well as
the bill's sponsors, testified to the importance of the law.Y John
Conyers (D-Mich.), a co-sponsor of the bill, testified that "'[d]evoting
federal resources to the collection of more information about this
problem will demonstrate a national commitment to the eradication of
hate crimes.""" Beyond its active supporters, the bill had wide support
in Congress.m In 1989, there was political utility to passing a law that
sent an "anti-prejudice" message." The off-year congressional elections
were around the comer, and a federal statistical act provided legislators
116. HCSA, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note; see also discussion supra note 6.
117. JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVrr, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY
AND BLOODSHED 200 (1993). Many of these groups advocated an approach based on their
own experience tracking racial or bias violence. Most prominent among these advocates was
the Southern Poverty Law Center whose Klanwatch publication had been tracking hate crime
almost from its inception, believing that to do so was a critical first step. See SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 11. The idea is that it is unable to address a problem,
until one knows with sufficiency the depth and breadth of that problem. See LEVIN &
MCDEVLrr, supra, at 200; see also discussion supra note 11.
118. See 131 CONG. REC. H5988-93 (daily ed. July 22, 1985). In the subsequent re-
introduction of the statistical act, definition would be critical to the debate. This early version
of the statistical act was targeted at collecting data on crimes motivated by race, religion, and
ethnicity. Id. See also JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 69.
119. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 69-70.
120. Id. The authors distill the testimony of the many private groups advocating for a
statistical law as outlining the following objectives:
1) help communities, legislatures, and law enforcement personnel respond
effectively by providing information on the frequency, location, extent, and patterns
of hate crime; 2) improve law enforcement's response by increasing awareness of
and sensitivity to hate crimes; 3) raise public awareness of the existence of hate
crimes; and 4) send a message that the federal government is concerned about hate
crime.
Id. (emphasis omitted). The authors note that looking back, it appears to them that it was the
latter two objectives and not the former that were accomplished by the HCSA. Id. at 70.
This frames the author's later discussion of "symbolic" legislation. See id. at 70,130-44.
121. Id. at 70 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-575, at 3 (1988)).
122. See generally id. at 69-70.
123. Id. at 70.
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with a safe way to delve into hate crime legislation. For one thing, the
Act would indeed be seen as a "significant step" that would "send an
additional important signal to victimized groups everywhere that the
U.S. Government is concerned about this kind of crime." '124 Most
importantly, however, it was only a step. Indeed, the HCSA did not
extend any substantive rights to any groups of victims; it merely called
for the systematic collection of data on this kind of crime.'z In many
ways, the HCSA can be called "symbolic" legislation. 26 Yet, supporters
and advocates did not view the Act as being merely symbolic; rather,
they saw the Act as the critical first step of the attack-namely,
identifying the problem.27 Solving the problem would, of course, be left
to subsequent legislation.
By the time the HCSA was re-introduced, the breadth of the bill
significantly changed. The new HCSA expanded the data collection
provisions contained in the 1985 Act to include a category for violence
against persons because of their sexual orientation.' This expansion of
the Act was the result of significant lobbying and substantial fact finding
into anti-gay violence by the criminal justice arm of the House Judiciary
Committee.129 When the HCSA appeared in the Senate, the provisions
relating to sexual orientation raised substantial questions with the
membership. Perhaps the most frank assessment of the expansion was
that this inclusion of sexual orientation prejudice would alter what had,
to then, been the understanding of the Civil Rights Act of 1964210
But the most vehement opposition of the HCSA went well beyond
this assessment. A group of four senators, led by Jesse Helms (R-N.C.),
124. Id. (quoting the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the HCSA, S. REP. No.
101-21, at 3 (1989)).
125. Id. at 69-70, 144.
126. Id. at 144. The authors critically view the concept of "symbolic" legislation. The
authors describe the term more fully saying, "proponents of bias crime laws believe that their
symbolic impact will be to teach Americans that prejudice is wrong and, in the long run, lead
to less prejudice and less prejudice-motivated crime." Id. The authors make clear their
position, however, that they find this belief "misguided." Id. Their point is that "[b]reaking
down generic criminal law into new crimes and punishment hierarchies depending on the
prejudices of offenders and the demographic identities of victims may exacerbate rather than
ameliorate social schisms and conflicts." Id.
127. See generally id. at 69-70.
128. Id. at 69. The authors surmise that this is due in large part to the lobbying of the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force with the assistance of Senator Barney Frank (D-
Mass.) that spurred the Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee to
conduct hearings on anti-homosexual violence that prompted the alteration to the HCSA. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 70-71.
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harshly condemned the extension of the HCSA to include collecting
data on sexual orientation prejudice." This contingent, indeed, viewed
the HCSA as symbolic politics, and was virulently opposed to the kind
of "message" with respect to homosexuality that was being sent by this
measure.' The opposition was unequivocal about its disdain for the
language including sexual orientation bias because they knew, as did
proponents, that the law would view homosexuals as a protected class."
This opposition bitterly condemned the Act in a written record, and
represented the four votes against the HSCA in the Senate."
What offset this ultra-conservative minority, and perhaps steadied
bipartisan support for the HCSA, was a "compromise move."1 35 This
move was to affix certain congressional findings to the Act that
expressed some of these reservations about the extension of the Act to
more palatably include sexual orientation bias.' The findings, however,
which were made in terms revering the American family, made it clear
that "'[n]othing in this Act shall be construed... to promote or
encourage homosexuality.""3 With these findings attached to the bill, it
passed easily in the Senate, and then in the House."
The passage of the HCSA was seen as a victory to many, and for
those, the Act marks, unequivocally, "'the first time in history that




133. Id. The authors explain that Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) authored a "Sense of
the Senate" amendment that "condemned homosexuality, rejected it as a lifestyle,
condemned government for extending civil rights to homosexuals, and called for strict
enforcement of state sodomy laws." Id. at 71 (citing 136 CONG. REc. S1169 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1990)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 71. Among those instrumental in the move, the authors tell us, was Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). Id. Senator Hatch played the role of the conciliator here, and he
played much the same kind of role in the debate over passage of the Hate Crime Prevention
Act of 1999 in the 106th Congress. 145 CONG. REC. S8952 (daily ed. July 21, 1999) (Senator
Hatch offering remarks on his proposed Hate Crime Bill). See also discussion supra note 5.
136. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 71.
137. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-275,104 Stat. 140 (1990) (citing Joseph M. Fernandez,
Bringing Hate Crime into Focus: The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 261, 278 (1991)).
138. Id. The HCSA passed the senate with a vote of 92-4. Id. See also 136 CONG. REC.
S1067 (1990). The measure passed in the House by a vote of 368-47. Id. See also 135 CONG.
REC. H3238 (1989).
139. Id. (quoting Tim McFeeley, Executive Director of the Human Rights Campaign
Fund, quoted in Bush Signs Act Requiring Records on Hate Crimes, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
1990); see also supra note 6.
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Though the HCSA extended no substantive rights on the basis of sexual
orientation, the inclusion of language regarding this distinct group
meant federal recognition of the problem of violence against gays,
despite qualification of the affixed findings. As opponents of the
measure recognized, a statistical act, while extending no substantive
rights, is, in fact, the "foundation for a subsequent federal response."' 40
In this light, many advocacy groups, especially those advocating for the
inclusion of provisions relating to sexual orientation, were content to
wait-believing that the statistics would speak for themselves and
141compel subsequent action. The concussions of the Congressional
debate over the HCSA would be felt throughout the following decade.
In 1992, William Jefferson Clinton was elected President. With him,
came a staunch agenda for action in the area of civil rights .' For many
minority groups who were affected, symbolically, or otherwise by the
Clinton agenda, his administration intensified the federal commitment
to civil rights.'43  The Clinton administration also seized upon
opportunities presented by Supreme Court decisions, such as Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, to amplify its response to the problem of hate crime, which
due to the efforts of the FBI and the Department of Justice, was
becoming a problem with substantially more objective shape.'"
Additionally, because of what was viewed administratively as progress
with regard to the data collecting effort, Congress accepted a provision
in the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 that would extend the data
141collecting efforts for five more years.
B. ENDA and D OMA: Fuel to the Fire
For advocates of gay civil rights, the decade following the enactment
of the HCSA was not as fortuitous. While these advocates continued
working to build on the success of the HCSA, the law's opponents
140. JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 71 (quoting H. R. REP. No. 100-575, at 12-13
(1988)) (expressing the dissenting views of five Republican members of the House Judiciary
Committee).
141. See generally id.
142. See, e.g., CAPA, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994 & Supp. III 1997). At President
Clinton's urging, Congress passed the Church Arson Prevention Act to respond to a rash of
arsons of black churches in the middle of the 1990s. Id. The move was seen as a commitment
to combat continued racial violence, particularly in the South. Kalam, supra note 7, at 597.
Congress used as an authority for this law, powers they possess over interstate commerce. Id.
See also CAPA, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note.
143. Kalam, supra note 7, at 597.
144. See generally LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 22-23.
145. See generally CAPA, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note; see also supra note 10.
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began to garner more support.14 The American family provisions that
were affixed to the HCSA framed the new question that now faced the
104th Congress. 47 Despite the language used by some in debating the
HCSA, the question was: Is there a federal obligation to protect citizens
in their sexual orientation? 48
There was substantial support in the 104th Congress for additional
expansions in the area of gay rights that built upon the new
consideration given to sexual orientation under federal law, which
though not clearly expressed, was implied by the HCSA.49  In 1996,
Congress began to craft a federal employment non-discrimination law,
which would come to be known as the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA).'5" ENDA proposed, quite simply, to include the category
of sexual orientation to already existing provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, and ethnicity."
Meanwhile, a large number among the 104th Congress concentrated
their efforts on expanding upon the resolutions regarding the American
family provisions of the HCSA."2 The efforts of this contingent
produced a different law, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
DOMA, while seen by many as another form of symbolic legislation,
was viewed by others as far from benign." Proponents and advocates of
gay civil rights understand the Act to be a means for the federal
government to subvert the Full Faith and Credit Clause with regard to
gay marriage."
By 1996, the debate in Congress over recognition of gay civil rights
had built up sufficient steam.55 Opposing forces in this debate met head
146. See generally JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4.
147. See id. at 69-71.
148. Id. at 71. (citing dissenters to the HCSA on the House Judiciary Committee as
saying, "[ilt is not a Federal obligation to protect citizens in their sexual orientation.").
149. See generally HCSA, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note; see also supra note 6.
150. See H.R. 1863,104th Cong. (1995) (this early draft of ENDA was introduced in the
House by Rep. Gerry E. Studds (D-MA)); see also Human Rights Campaign, The
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, available at http://www.hrc.org/issues/FederaLleg/
enda/index.asp (last visited Oct. 14,2001) [hereinafter HRC].
151. Id.
152 See generally JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 69-71. See also discussion supra
note 135.
153. See HRC, supra note 150, What the Defense of Marriage of Act Does, (Dec. 11,
2000), available at http://www.hre.org/issues/marriage/background/domadoes.asp (last visited
Sept. 30,2001) [hereinafter Marriage].
154. Id.
155. See generally discussion supra Parts IfI.A-B.
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on in the 104th Congress, and the membership, with their actions on
ENDA and DOMA, unequivocally answered the question on sexual
orientation. When ENDA went before the floor of the Senate it failed
by one vote, fifty to forty-nine.156 Just subsequent to the ENDA's failure
on the Senate floor, both the Senate and the House passed DOMA,
which was signed into law by President Clinton in September 1996.'
The Human Rights Campaign (HRC), which is a prolific advocate of
gay civil rights, viewed these successive actions by Congress as staunch
defeats.'58 Paramount among their concerns was that the message sent
by the 104th Congress was not only not cordial to those advocating gay
civil rights, but rather was overtly hostile to them.9
The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans,'6 also handed
down in 1996, offered little consolation to groups like the HRC. In
Romer, the Supreme Court struck down Colorado's "Amendment 2,"
which was designed to prohibit any governmental action designed to
protect the civil rights of homosexuals.'6' In the words of the Court, the
Colorado law was "inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class
it affects."'6 2 Facially, the Romer decision appeared to be positive for
those advocating for recognition of gay civil rights; but, the opinion
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist said something more. While the
majority found the Colorado law to be characterized as an expression of
nothing more than "animus" towards homosexuals, the decision could
not be seen, by any terms, as advancing recognition of gay civil rights.'6
Perhaps the most telling part of the Court's decision in Romer, though,
was illustrated by the equal protection analysis to which the Colorado
law was subject.'6 Because the class implicated by the case was
composed of gay, lesbian, and bisexual men and women, the Colorado
law was only subjected to the rational basis test rather than the strict
scrutiny test which is applied to laws that implicate race, religion, or
ethnicity.
156. HRC, supra note 150.
157. See Marriage, supra note 153.
158. Id.
159. See generally id.
160. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
161. See generally id.
162 Id. at 632.
163. Id. at 633.
164. Id.
165. Id. Traditionally, the analysis of laws challenged under the equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment are subjected to different levels of scrutiny when
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All said, 1996 was seen as a difficult year for advocates of gay civil
rights. The years leading up to the close of this century did not prove to
be any more fortuitous for these advocates. The legislative potential
that many saw in the HCSA's recognition of sexual orientation
prejudice at the beginning of the 1990s now languished in the wake of
the words and actions of the 104th Congress.
C. The 106th Congress and the Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999
In the 106th Congress, the debate over sexual orientation raged on.
The societal backdrop, however, had raised the stakes for legislators.
The media widely publicized the brutal 1998 slayings of Matthew
Shepard' 66 and James Byrd, Jr. '67 This broad coverage captured the
minds of legislators and their constituents.s The juxtaposition in time
of these two murders, as well as the prolific and sensational coverage of
these crimes by the media, not only compelled a national discussion of
hate crime, but also seemed to assume that they were the same kind of
crime.169
The sensational coverage of these criminal acts by the media
operated as a catalyst for action on behalf of the federal government,
much as it did in 1963 when cameras caught the brutal police violence
against blacks on the streets of Birmingham, Alabama.70 In the opening
they affect suspect, as opposed to non-suspect classes. See CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 102, at 565, 601. Still today, race, religion, and ethnicity are the only classifications that
the Supreme Court has recognized as "kicking in" the heightened, or strict scrutiny level of
the analysis. See id. Bids have been made, however, to add a third level to the analysis, that
of intermediate scrutiny to apply to laws affecting other classifications, like gender. See
generally id. at 697-98.
166. See generally Lacayo, supra note 2; Brooke, supra note 2.
167. See generally Cropper, supra note 2.
168. See discussion supra notes 2-10.
169. Hate crime was no longer being discussed in solely a racial context as with the
murder of James Byrd, Jr., but this term had also come to include those victimized because of
their sexual orientation. In this way, the national discussion seemed to be focused on the
concept of hate or bias motivated activity, as well as the classification of the victim. See
discussion supra note 2.
170. See CUMMINGS & WISE, supra note 88, at 186-88:
In the Spring of 1963 Dr. [Martin Luther] King organized demonstrations against
segregation in industrial Birmingham, Alabama. When arrests failed to stop the
demonstrators, the authorities used high-pressure fire hoses, police dogs, and cattle
prods. The demonstrators sang We Shall Overcome and continued to march.
Photographs of police dogs attacking demonstrators on orders of Birmingham Police
Commissioner Eugene "Bull" Connor went out on the news wires. Another
photograph showed police kneeling on a black woman and pinning her to the
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months of the 106th Congress, Senator Edward Kennedy of
Massachusetts introduced, with thirty-three co-sponsors, a response in
the form of the Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999.171
D. The Hate Crime Amendment of 1999-The "Kennedy" Bill
From the time he introduced the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
1999 (HCPA), Senator Kennedy made clear that this new hate crime
law had a simple goal-to fill two distinct voids in the hate crimes
legislation already in place.'7 Indeed, many viewed this new law as the
"logical culmination" of the line of federal hate crime legislation that
began with the HCSA."3 The HCPA proposed to amend 18 U.S.C. §
245 to fll these distinct voids. First, the bill would extend Title 18's
protections by making violence against persons because of race, religion,
or ethnicity, punishable regardless of whether the victim was engaged in
one of six narrowly defined federal activities." Second, it would extend
the same protections to persons victimized because of disability, gender,
and sexual orientation.175
Congress passed the HCPA using its authority under the Commerce
Clause.'76 The bill is clear about the commerce nexus, showing
Congress's awareness of the modern Supreme Court's view on this
power, as expressed in Lopez." Adopting language directly from the
majority opinion in Lopez, the bill purports to punish bias crimes when
the circumstances show that "in connection with the offense, the
defendant or the victim travels in interstate or foreign commerce, uses a
facility or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce, or engages
in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce; or... the
offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce."'78
Kennedy proffered his bill with strong language, saying "[i]t's an
embarrassment that we haven't already acted to close these glaring gaps
in present law," and that "Congress has a responsibility to act this
sidewalk. The scenes outraged much of the nation and the world.
Id. at 186.
171. HCPA, S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999); see also discussion supra note 5.
172. 145 CONG. REC. S2730 (Mar. 16, 1999) (statement of Senator Kennedy, D-Mass.).
173. Kalam, supra note 7, at 597.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994).
175. Id.
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year...." 7 9  The HCPA was submitted immediately to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, and the debate in Congress over the HCPA
moved to that committee. 'S
Less than two months later, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard
testimony from Judy Shepard, the mother of Matthew Shepard."8 ' Judy
Shepard told the Committee that she was there "to urge the expedient
passage of the Hate Crime Prevention Act."' As part of her testimony,
she solemnly recounted details of her son's tragic death, showing a keen
awareness of the constitutional issues raised by the legislation she was
there to urge. She told the Committee, "I can assure opponents of this
legislation first hand, it was not words or thoughts, but violent actions
that killed my son.""
Even before Judy Shepard's testimony before the Senate, the story
of her son had become synonymous with hate crime in the public
imagination." For the remainder of the term, much of the discussion in
Congress with respect to hate crime concerned the expanded definition
of hate crime proffered by the HCPA. ' This discussion was perhaps
most acutely captured by Gordon Smith (R-Or.), who was once an
opponent of the inclusion of sexual orientation protection in hate crime
legislation.' 8 Senator Smith addressed the Senate floor saying, "This is a
very controversial thing with many Senators.... It is controversial
because it includes a new category: '... for sexual orientation.' And
many of my friends in the Senate believe that disqualifies it from
consideration."1 Smith, who was speaking immediately before Senate
179. 145 CONG. REC. S2730 (daily ed. Mar. 16,1999).
180. Id. (referring HCPA to the Senate Judiciary Committee).
181. See United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Testimony of Judy Shepard,
available at http:llwww.senate.gov/-judiciary/51199js.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001). See also
145 CONG. REc. D505, D507 (daily ed. May 11, 1999) (officially noting testimony of Judy
Shepard before the Senate Judiciary Committee).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying discussion.
185. Wheeler, supra note 25 (quoting Representative Nathan Deal (R-Gainesville) as
asking "'[W]hy should we be making it a federal offense because of the sexual orientation of a
victim? ... I don't believe we need to expand federal jurisdiction into these areas.'"). Accord
145 CONG. RaeC. H14400 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999) (including statement from Representative
Feinstein, (D-CaL): "Unfortunately, there are those who would stop short of supporting this
important legislation because it extends protections to those targeted on account of their
sexual orientation.").
186. 145 CONG. REC. S5336 (daily ed. June 19, 2000) (statement of Senator Smith (R-
Or.)).
187. Id. at S5337.
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voted on the HCPA, concluded saying, "[s]ome will say: [t]he Kennedy
amendment is not constitutional. I believe it is constitutional. I believe
it is OK to say we will help Americans-how we find them-whether
they are black, whether they are disabled, or whether they are gay.""
In June 2000, almost a year after Judy Shepard's testimony to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the Senate approved the HCPA by a vote of fifty-
seven to forty-two.'s' Many supporters were optimistic at the result of
the vote, but they knew that though they were out of the Senate, they
were not yet out of the woods. 9'
In the course of its referral to the Senate committee, the HCPA had
been attached to an annual defense authorization bill. 9' Controversy
arose when the House version of the legislation had omitted the crucial
language relating to sexual orientation.' 9' To resolve this controversy,
the HCPA was set before a conference committee, which is one of three
principle vehicles with which differences between the two chambers of
Congress are worked out.'93 Thus, the HCPA awaited action in one of
the safest places that Congress may place a bill. 94 Supporters of the
HCPA, however, knew full well that should the measure make it out of
conference committee, House members would "vote up or down on the
overall bill, not individual pieces.""5
E. The "Hatch" Bill
From the outset of the 106th Congress, Senator Orrin Hatch had
opposed the extension of federal hate crime legislation in the way that
Senator Kennedy's HCPA proposed. 6 Just as he had in the 100th
Congress, Hatch publicly advocated an approach to hate crimes that was
188. Id. at S5838.
189. Simon, supra note 13, at A17.
190. See generally How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 12, at 102 ("Before a bill can be
sent to the White House for the president's signature, it must be approved in identical form
by both chambers of Congress.").
191. See George B. Griffin, Detractors Condemn Expanded Definition Kennedy Backer
of Hate Crimes Measure, TELEGRAM & GAZZETTE (Worcester, Mass.), June 29, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 10212981.
192. Wheeler, supra note 25.
193. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 12, at 102 ("There are three ways of resolving
differences between the two Houses: one chamber may yield to the other and simply accept
its amendments; amendments move back and forth between the two houses until both agree;
or a conference committee may be convened.").
194. See id. at 102-09.
195. Wheeler, supra note 25.
196. Lee Davidson, Hatch Opposes Measure to 'Federalize' Hate Crimes, DESERET
NEWS, Oct. 5, 1999.
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geared more toward aid to local law enforcement and reporting
efforts.1'9 Hatch's argument was that "[b]efore we take the step of
making every criminal offense motivated by hatred a federal offense, we
ought to equip states and localities with the resources necessary so that
they can undertake these criminal investigations... on their own." '198
Senator Hatch realized, perhaps prophetically, the importance of the
coming elections in 2000. Indeed, in the 2000 presidential. election,
where crime was a perennial platform issue, hate crime was the only
criminal issue that was disputed by the candidates.' 99
Senator Hatch, one of the architects of the compromise that enabled
passage of the HCSA in the 100th Congress, designed a solution again in
the 106th.m Sensing partisan rancor in Congress over the defense bill
due to the disputes over the HCPA, Hatch introduced a competing hate
crimes measure to take the place of Kennedy's bill.:' Hatch carefully
designed the bill to effectuate a compromise, so that many Republicans
could go to their constituents in an election year and be able to say they
voted for a hate crimes bill.2' At the same time, Hatch's measure
dubiously stripped the measure of the critical language regarding sexual
orientation, while purporting to remain focused on crime against this
particular group.!
Again, we must be reminded that the devil is in the details. Hatch's
measure, entitled "To Combat Hate Crimes," was carefully designed.
Though the Hatch bill shared many characteristics with the Kennedy
measure, it was also crucially different. Like Kennedy's bill, the Hatch
measure proposed to amend the United States Code."4 Also like
Kennedy's bill, the Hatch bill purportedly relies on Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause to authorize the substantive part of the
law. This fact alone would seem to undermine any argument between
197. Id.; Kalam, supra note 7, at 597.
198. Davidson, supra note 196, at B4.
199. During the presidential debates, the candidates even went so far as to invoke the
names of both Kennedy and Hatch as signaling the approach to hate crime that each
advocated. Bush, of course, with Hatch, and Gore with Senator Kennedy.
200. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 71.
201. To Combat Hate Crimes, S. 1406,106th Congress (1999); see also supra note 5.
202. Griffin, supra note 191, at Al, available at 2000 WL 10212981 ("The really key issue
here is we have an election year coming.") (quoting Raj Purohit, Director of Legislative
Affairs for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
203. S. 1406; see also supra note 5.
204. S. 1406 § 4(e)(1). This section entitled "INTERSTATE TRAVEL TO COMMIT




Democrats and Republicans as to the legitimacy of exercising this power
to enforce hate crimes. Yet, the critical difference of the Hatch measure
is that, unlike Kennedy's HCPA, it does not extend its substantive
protections to persons victimized because of their sexual orientation.
6
The Hatch measure can be fairly divided into two parts. The first
part focuses on "studies,"2' and the second part focuses on "interstate
travel to commit hate crime."m The "studies" part of the Hatch bill
calls for a dramatic augmentation of the work begun with the HCSA
and expanded by both the VCCLEA and CAPA.o The bill proposes to
accomplish through this section a stronger link between the federal
government and local authorities, an approach that Hatch has advocated
since the HCSA.2 0 The "studies" section calls for grants, data
collections, and reimbursements.2 11 For the purpose of this section of the
Act, Hatch adopts the definition of hate crime given in the first section
of the HCSA 2  This definition, as Hatch knew full well from his
experience with the bill in the 100th Congress, as well as in subsequent
years, included victims of sexual orientation bias as one of its focus
groups, along with race, religion, ethnicity, gender, and disability.
213
The part of the Hatch bill that is slightly more dubious is the section
focused on "interstate travel to commit hate crimes "-the section of the
bill containing substantive protections. 2 4 This section proposes to add a
new section 249 to the already established provisions of title 18.215 In
much the same way as Kennedy's bill, the Hatch measure creates a new
substantive proscription against hate crime when such activity "affects"
interstate commerce.2"6 The difference in this part of the bill is that
these substantive provisions are only extended on the basis of "race,
color, religion, or national origin.""2 7  This is the critical difference.
Without embellishment, it can be said that the only real difference
between the Kennedy and Hatch measures is that the Hatch bill did not
206. See id. § 4(e).
207. Id. § 1(b)(1).
208. Id. § 4(e).
209. Id. § 1(b).
210. See generally JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 69-71.
211. S. 1406 § 1(b).
212. Id. § 4(e). Accord HCSA, 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (1994).
213. See generally JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 69-71.
214. See S. 1406 § 4(e).
215. This part of title 18 was established by provisions in both the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968.
216. S. 1406 § 4(e) (1999); see also supra note 5.
217. S. 1406 § 4(e).
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propose to extend federal hate crime legislation to protect citizens in
their sexual orientation. On the other hand, Senator Kennedy's
measure did. Just prior to being dropped from the defense bill to which
it was attached, President Clinton was sanguine about the controversy
that remained over hate crimes, saying "[w]e all know what the deal is
here... [t]he Republican majority does not want a bill that explicitly
provides hate crimes protections for gay Americans." '218
Despite the tireless work of Kennedy and nearly 40 years after
President John F. Kennedy asked whether all Americans would be
afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, the 106th Congress did
not have an answer. 19 In October of 2000, citing exigencies of national
security associated with the annual defense authorization bill, Senator
John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Armed Service
Committee, said that the hate crimes measure had to be dropped "[i]n
the interest of national defense."' 0 Seiator Warner said that he had
pushed for the removal of the bill in an effort to subvert a filibuster by
conservative Republicans that was likely to block passage of the defense
spending bill, part and parcel."
IV. CONCLUSION
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.'
So it is that the struggle to extend modern federal civil rights
legislation remains right where it started. In the late 1980s, the question
was posed whether there was a federal obligation to protect citizens in
their sexual orientation.2m Actions by Congress leading up to the 106th
term appeared to negatively answer that question. After the 106th
Congress, apparently the best answer is that we are not yet sure.
218. Simon, supra note 13, at A-17.
219. See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 80, at xx.
220. Simon, supra note 13, at A-17.
221. Id. It is sadly ironic that the threat of a filibuster by conservative Republicans
killed the HCPA. It was thirty-five years ago when an equally conservative Republican
contingent failed at killing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by a filibuster. See generally WHALEN
& WHALEN, supra note 80, at 149-51.
222. T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS OF T.S. ELIOT
197 (Valerie Eliot ed., 1969).
223. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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The problem of hate crimes is still lodged in the public imagination.
More than two years after the tragic death of Matthew Shepard, his
story is still in the forefront of the public discussion of hate crime. On
January 10-11, 2000, in an effort to atone for profit it earned from
controversial rapper Eminem, MTV suspended its regular programming
to air, commercial free, hate crime victims' names and stories. ' "'Our
hope is it really gets the attention of our audience and motivates them to
get involved,"' said Brian Graden, the network's programming
president.m The week following the airing of victims' names, MTV
intended to air a made-for-TV movie about Matthew Shepard. "6 In
addition, on January 4, 2001, Yahoo, one of the Internet's most prolific
launch sites, set into effect a ban on the sale of all hate-related items on
their auction site."m Brian Fitzgerald, senior producer for Yahoo
auctions said, "'We're trying to improve the quality of the site and these
items have been detracting from the quality."' m This action by Yahoo
seems to reflect a national consensus against hate activity of all kinds,
conveniently couched, as it is by Yahoo, as a quality of life issue.m
Though the public remains concerned with the issue of hate crimes,
it is imperative that Congress acts to extend civil rights legislation to
include proscriptions against anti-gay violence." °  This necessity is
perhaps best explained by Frederick Lawrence, who posits that:
[A government] makes a normative statement about the
treatment of gays and lesbians when it frames its bias crime law.
Failure to include sexual orientation implies that gays and
lesbians are not as deserving of protection as racial, religious, or
ethnic minorities, and that sexual orientation is not as serious a
social fissure line as race, religion, and ethnicity." 1
224. David Baude, MTVs Mea Culpa: MTV Does Penance for Eminem Boost, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 8,2001, at E-7, available at 2001 WL 3447134.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. George A. Chidi Jr. & Rick Perera, Yahoo Bans Hate-Group Commerce Sites from
its Web Portal, INFOWORLD, Jan. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 8082829 (banning all Nazi or
KKK items and any other items from groups that "'promote or glorify hatred and violence'").
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 20. Lawrence operates on the assumption that the
same normative statement is made when the federal government frames its laws. See
generally id. at 110-60 (discussing the federal role in prosecuting bias crimes).
231. Id. at 20.
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To some, however, this is a slippery slope.3 2 Senator Hatch
observed that the HCPA would make it possible to prosecute a suspect
who was charged with rape under Kennedy's hate crime law. 3
Moreover, opponents of including a classification for sexual orientation
in federal hate crime legislation view the inclusion of such a
classification as unwarranted. To these opponents, gay, lesbian, and bi-
sexual men and women are seeking special rights, to which they are not
legally entitled.' Naturally, these same opponents direct their concern
toward what kinds of groups might next seek federal protection of its
civil rights. Anthony Winer addresses the question, saying simply:
If any such group could show that hate crimes against its
members across the country were widespread, persistent and
significant, that a social history of hate crime against its members
existed, that such incidents were tabulated and recorded, and
that such incidents produced identifiable and distinct patterns of
criminal behavior in perpetrators, then the social reality of their
victimization would be established.35
Such a case has been amply made regarding the victims of violence
because of sexual orientation.6 Though we are wise to be careful with
hate crime statistics,27 it is gay, lesbian, and bisexual men and women
who are among the most victimized by hate crimes.38 And, indeed, as
Senator Kennedy has remarked, this is an "embarrassment.""
In the time since the close of the 106th session of Congress and the
232. It seems almost inevitable that in discussions over expanding federal civil rights
laws, someone invokes this oft-trotted out phrase.
233. See Davidson, supra note 196, at B-4.
234. See generally Baker, supra note 2; see also JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 4, at 65-
68, 90. Though these authors may not claim to see gay, lesbian, and bi-sexual men and
women as unaffected by hate crime, they do view the struggle of these people in the area of
hate crime legislation as seeking special rights. Id.
235. Winer, supra note 27, at 434.
236. See id.
237. See generally supra note 11.
238. LAwRENCE, supra note 22, at 17-18 ("It is difficult to make a strong argument that
crime motivated by bias based on sexual orientation-'gay bashing'-does not fit the bias
crime model .... If one of the purposes of bias crime statutes is to protect frequently
victimized groups, sexual orientation is particularly worthy of inclusion .... A Department
of Justice report noted that 'homosexuals are probably the most frequent victims of hate
crimes."').




start of the 107th session, we have changed our guard. On January 20,
2001, George W. Bush was sworn in as President of the United States.2, °
Many proponents of civil rights have questioned whether the new
presidential administration will be committed to advancing hate crime
legislation." These critics point in particular to his choice of John
Ashcroft as Attorney General. 42 Nevertheless, it has been nearly a year
that the current administration, with John Ashcroft, has been in place.
In that time, the Administration has sent mixed messages on civil rights.
On the one hand, John Ashcroft has taken his post as Attorney General
and come out unequivocally against the use of racial profiling as a
method of law enforcement.243 This and similar expressions on the part
of the Attorney General have ameliorated some of the pre-conceived
fears about this Administration's stance on civil rights, at least in the
context of race.2"
With respect to the civil rights of gay, lesbian, and bisexual men and
women, however, the message is decidedly less comforting. The Bush
Administration has made efforts to significantly advance what it has
termed as faith-based initiatives.245 This past summer, the Bush
Administration formed an alliance with the nation's largest charity, the
Salvation Army, to forward these initiatives.246 In essence, the alliance
was based on a commitment by the Administration to issue regulations
exempting charities like the Salvation Army from state and local
discrimination laws.247 In return, the Salvation Army agreed to use its
240. URGENT. Bush Sworn in as 43rd U.S. President, AGENCE FR.-PRFsSE, Jan. 20,
2001, available at 2001 WL 2325656.
241. See generally Jack E. White, The Wrong Choice for Justice: Ashcroft Will Ignite the
Most Furious Nomination Since Bork and Tower, TIME, Jan. 8, 2001, at 30; Nancy Gibbs &
Michael Duffy, The Fight for Justice, TIME, Jan. 22, 2001, at 20.
242 White, supra note 241, at 30; Gibbs & Duffy, supra note 241, at 20.
243. Thomas B. Edsall, Attorney General Cites 'Candid Exchange' and Stresses
Agreement on Profiling, WASH. POST, March 1, 2001, at A6 ("'I believe profiling is an
unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection under our Constitution,' Ashcroft said.").
244. See generally supra note 238.
245. Dana Milbank, Charity Cites Bush Help in Fight Against Hiring Gays Salvation
Army Wants Exemption from Laws, WASH. POST, July 10, 2001, at Al. These initiatives
essentially seek to direct an increasing amount of government funds to religious charities. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. ("The matter stems from a national debate spurred by an incresing number of
local jurisdictions that have adopted laws requiring religious groups such as the Salvation
Army to adhere to laws barring discrimination against gays in hiring, job promotion and
benefits. What the administration is suggesting... is a federal regulation that would forbid
states and localities from barring such discrimination when administering programs with
federal funds.").
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influence to advance the Administration's faith-based programs.2' The
move was controversial, as it would enable religious charities to
discriminate against gays in hiring, promotion, and domestic partner
benefits, despite local laws.249
Once the story broke in the national media, the Administration was
quick to clarify the alliance with the Salvation Army. White House
press secretary, Ari Fleischer, informed the press that faith-based
groups already had the power under current federal law to discriminate
against gays in hiring, and that it was state and local jurisdictions that
were seeking to require these groups to include gays in their
employment protections.m0 In an immediate about face, the Bush
Administration dropped its consideration of the regulation it committed
to the Salvation Army. 1 The Administration abandoned the alliance
after Democratic leaders in Congress came out against it."2 In response
to reports about the agreement between the Bush White House and the
Salvation Army, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.)
expressed his concern, saying "'I'm troubled by secret deals. I'm
troubled by any deal that would not show the kind of tolerance that I
think we should show in this country.' "'z
Senator Daschle's comments illustrate that the torch carried by some
in Congress for gay civil rights is not extinguished. In fact, Daschle and
his Democratic colleagues in the Senate are now in a sturdier position to
advance legislation on hate crime, and the inclusion of sexual
orientation in such legislation, following the power shift caused by
Vermont Senator Jim Jefford's announcement that he would become an
Independent.' From this new position of power, Daschle has stated
248. Id. According to the article, the Salvation Army projected spending $88,000-
$110,000 per month in its effort to advance Bush's charitable choice initiatives. Id.
249. Id. (claiming that the document containing the agreement between the
Administration and the Salvation Army, "offers a rare glimpse into the private dealings of the
Bush White House, and it suggests President Bush is willing to achieve through regulation
ends too controversial to survive the legislative process"); see also supra note 238.
250. Milbank, supra note 245.
251. Dana Milbank, Bush Drops Rule On Hiring of Gays; Democrats: 'Faith-Based'
Initiative at Risk, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at Al.
252. Id.
253. Id. In addition, gay rights groups have reacted angrily to this action on the part of
the Bush Administration. Ralph G. Neas, the president of the liberal group, People for the
American Way, contends that the proposed regulation acts to "imperil fundamental rights."
Id.
254. In the Senate, It's the Day of the Democrats (June 6, 2001), available at http:ll




that his "'message will be, let's find a way to work together, to find a
middle ground on the array of issues we all care about."'" 5 Among the
issues cited by Daschle, was the issue of "hate crimes. "'"6
Even before the power shift in the Senate, the opening weeks of the
first session of the 107th Congress saw the introduction of a hate crimes
measure almost identical to the HCPA introduced to the House of
Representatives by a Texas Democrat. ' 7 And, again, Congress has the
opportunity to answer the fundamental question of "whether all
Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunity. ' 25
Unfortunately, the bill proposed by Sheila Jackson-Lee, which was
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary in January of 2001,
has remained there, untouched, while the House focuses on other
objectives of the Bush agenda. 9  So it is that this Comment is
unfortunately named. Rather than being a Comment about recent
legislation, the piece is decidedly about 'a failure to pass recent
legislation.' Thus, the modern line of hate crime legislation ends where
it started-with an embroilment in Congress over the issue of sexual
orientation.
Certainly, the issue of whether to include sexual orientation in the
protections of federal hate crime law is a "value-driven question. ''
Ultimately, this means that if we are to go further with federal hate
crime legislation, Congress must squarely answer the question posed
early on: Does the federal government have a duty to protect its citizens
in their sexual orientation?2 6' Many advocates have compellingly
answered yes. When Judy Shepard testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1999, she urged that the committee understand that her
son was dead
because the men who killed him learned to hate. Somehow and
somewhere they received the message that the lives of gay
people are not as worthy of respect, dignity and honor as the
lives of other people. They were given the impression that
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 147 CONG. REC. H27 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001) (referred to the House Committee on
the Judiciary).
258. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 80, at xx.
259. 147 CONG. REC. H27 (daily ed. Jan. 3,2001); 147 CONG. REC. H58 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
2001).
260. LAWRENCE, supra note 22, at 19.
261. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 4, at 68-71.
[85:537
RECENT LEGISLA TION: HATE CRIMES
society condoned or at least was indifferent to violence against
gay and lesbian Americans. a6
It is clear from this statement that the only way for our government
to not condone or perpetuate this kind of intolerance is to condemn it.
Facing this truth, let us hope that our government will soon, in some
measure of earnestness, undertake this task.
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262. See United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Testimony of Judy Shepard,
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